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This paper is an attempt to contribute to a fairly well-established line of research
that is concerned with the output and welfare performances of alternative monopo-
listic pricing policies in a spatial context. Studies along this line can be basically
grouped into two strands. The rst assumes that demands are linear. It is shown
that, when market area is xed, the consumers' surplus and social welfare are both the
highest (lowest) under mill (uniform) pricing, with discriminatory pricing in between
(Beckmann, 1976). However, when the market boundary is endogenous, spatial price
discrimination provides a higher level of output and hence greater social welfare than
mill pricing (Greenhut and Ohta, 1972; Holahan, 1975), whereas output and prot
remain unchanged, and the consumers' surplus and social welfare are lower under uni-
form pricing as compared to under mill pricing (Hsu, 1983). Furthermore, when the
rm's choice of location is endogenous, not only is it the case that discriminatory pric-
ing could result in higher social welfare than mill pricing (Hwang and Mai, 1990), but
uniform pricing may dominate the other two in terms of consumers' surplus and social
welfare when demands in dierent markets are suciently heterogeneous (Tan, 2001b).
The second strand is concerned with non-linear demands. If demand is convex
(concave), Smithies (1941) and Stevens and Rydell (1966) demonstrate that mill pricing
is more (less) protable than uniform pricing; Cheung and Wang (1996) prove that,
provided other respective conditions are satised, social welfare under mill pricing is
higher (lower) than under uniform pricing. In addition, over a broad range of demand
concavities, spatial price discrimination is shown by Greenhut and Ohta (1975, 1979),
Greenhut, Norman and Hung (1987), and Ohta and Wako (1988) to perform better
than mill pricing, whereas de Palma and Liu (1993), by adopting a binary logit demand,
demonstrate that discriminatory pricing could provide the highest social welfare.
The considerable literature on monopolistic pricing policies has been conned to
a deterministic world. However, information about market demand is always incom-
plete and costly. The rm, accordingly, faces random demands in making its pricing
1and location decisions. Moreover, the economic theory of uncertainty as well as the
location theory of the rm have shown that the implications of uncertainty for a rm's
production and location decisions are signicant.1 It may therefore be worthwhile
examining the impact of uncertainty on the performance of alternative monopolistic
pricing policies.
In the present paper, we consider a risk-averse monopolist who faces two markets
with stochastic and linear demands. The monopolist is assumed to commit to an irre-
versible price in each market before the uncertainty is resolved. Several unconventional
results are shown to be triggered by the presence of demand uncertainty. The reason
for the reversal of orthodox intuition is the asymmetry in the risk chacteristics of the
markets and the willingness of the monopolist to trade increased level of expected
prots for reduced risk.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we lay out the
model and derive basic results under alternative pricing policies. In Section 3, we
compare the outcomes with a predetermined location, and in Section 4 compare them
with endogenous location choice. In the nal section we conclude the paper.
2. The Basic Model
Following Hwang and Mai (1990), we assume that the plant location of a monopolist
is limited to a set of points along a line of length s between market 1 and market 2
as illustrated in Figure 1. The two markets are segmented and consumer arbitrage is
prohibited.
[Place Figure 1 about here.]
The demand in the two markets is assumed to be linear with the same quantity
intercept and slope, and is subject to random disturbances:
qi = a   bpi + "i; i = 1;2; (1)
1See, for example, Mathur (1983), Hsu and Mai (1984), Park and Mathur (1988, 1990), Tan and
Hsu (2000), and Tan (2001a).
2where pi and qi are the delivered price and sales in market i, i = 1;2, respectively; a
and b are positive constants; and "1 and "2 are random variables. It is postulated that
("1;"2) has a bivariate distribution with E("i) = 0, E("2
i) = 2
i , and Cov("1;"2) = 12.2
Let x be the distance between market 1 and the monopolist's location, say, point A
in Figure 1, and t the constant transport rate per unit quantity and distance of output.
Under a mill price m, the delivered prices in market 1 and market 2 are m + tx and
m + t  (s   x), respectively. The monopolist's prot under mill pricing is thus

m = (m;"1;"2)
= (m   c)f[a   b  (m + tx) + "1] + fa   b  [m + t  (s   x)] + "2gg; (2)
where c is the constant marginal cost.
In the case of a uniform pricing policy, consumers in the two markets face the same
delivered price, p. Accordingly, total prot is

u = (p;"1;"2)
= (p   c   tx)(a   bp + "1) + [p   c   t  (s   x)](a   bp + "2): (3)
Contrastly, dierent delivered prices are charged to consumers in dierent markets
by a discriminatory monopolist. As a consequence, the monopolist's prot is

d = (p1;p2;"1;"2)
= (p1   c   tx)(a   bp1 + "1) + [p2   c   t  (s   x)](a   bp2 + "2): (4)
Furthermore, the monopolist is assumed to have a mean-variance utility function
in prot,3 namely
U[(;"1;"2)] = (;"1;"2)  

2
 [(;"1;"2)   (;0;0)]
2; (5)
where   0 is an index of risk aversion.
2Since the demands are linear and thus must be bounded from below, it is assumed that the
distribution functions of the demand shocks are bounded from below as well.
3The mean-variance utility function has the convenient property that it is linear in the mean and
variance of prot. The mean-variance analysis is justied when the joint-density function of ("1;"2)
is bivariate normal or when the utility function is quadratic. For detail, see Huang and Litzenberger
(1988).
32.1 Mill Pricing
Combining (2) and (5) yields the monopolist's expected utility of prot under mill
pricing as
E[U(









2 + 212): (6)





f[a   b  (m + tx)]






and total welfare, dened as the sum of expected consumers' surplus and producer's





The monopolist seeks the optimal mill price, m, and plant location, x, in order to
maximize E[U(m)]. It is easy to see from (6) that E[U(m)] is independent of x and,5
thus, all values of 0  x  s can be considered as an optimal location. Setting the








2 + 212)]; (8)
where D  4b +   (2
1 + 2
2 + 212) > 0. Substituting (8) into (1) gives the aggregate
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6It is assumed throughout the paper that both markets have non-negative demand for any realiza-
tion of the random component under the optimal prices in all three pricing policies.
42.2 Uniform Pricing
The monopolist's expected utility of prot under uniform pricing, based on (3) and
(5), is
E[U(
u)] = [2(p   c)   ts](a   bp)  

2




+[p   c   t  (s   x)]
2
2
2 + 2(p   c   tx)[p   c   t  (s   x)]12g; (10)
















A uniform pricing rm maximizes E[U(u)] with respect to p and x. Via the two
stage approach, we obtain the optimal uniform price and aggregate expected output




f2a + b  (2c + ts) +   f(c + tx)
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fb  [2a   b  (ts + 2c)] +   [H1  (
2
1 + 12) + H2  (
2
2 + 12)]g; (11)
where H1  a   b  (c + tx) and H2  a   b  [c + t  (s   x)].







2  12)g = 0: (12)
The solution for (12) is tedious generally. Nevertheless, if 2
1 = 2
2, namely, the two
markets are identically risky, then the optimal choice of location for a uniform pricer
is xu = s=2.8




2   212)]. It follows that
the optimal location may be interior if (2
1 + 2
2   212)D > (2
1   2
2)2.
8It follows from (12) that xu = f[p(xu)   c](2
1   2
2) + ts  (2
2   12)g=[t  (2
1 + 2
2   212)]: If
2
1 = 2
2, it is easy to see that xu = s=2.
52.3 Discriminatory Pricing
The resulting expected utility of prot under discriminatory pricing, by means of
(4) and (5), is
E[U(
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Maximizing (13) with respect to p1 and p2 yields the optimal discriminatory prices
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E[Q
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12][c + t  (s   x)]g; (14)




Moreover, by applying the envelope theorem, we have
dE[U(d)]
dx









2 + 212)] > 0:
It turns out that E[U(d)] is strictly convex with respect to x. The optimal location for
a discriminatory monopolist, therefore, can be either in market 1 or market 2, which
in turn depends on the relative magnitudes of E[U(d(x = 0))] and E[U(d(x = s))].
6Comparing E[U(d(x = 0))] and E[U(d(x = s))] yields
E[U(










> 0 if 2
2 > 2
1,
= 0 if 2
2 = 2
1,
< 0 if 2
2 < 2
1.
It follows that a risk-averse discriminatory monopolist will choose to locate in the less
risky market; if the two markets are identically risky, then the monopolist may locate
his plant in either market 1 or market 2.
3. Comparisons of Alternative Pricing Policies with a Predetermined Lo-
cation
In this section, we examine the implications of uncertainty on the performance of
alternative pricing policies with a predetermined location.
3.1 Aggregate Expected Output
First, it is interesting to note from (9), (11) and (14) that, under the three pricing
regimes, total expected output under demand uncertainty is greater than its determin-
istic counterpart, which can be obtained by setting  = 0. It conrms the well-known
result that a risk-averse monopolist will price closer to marginal cost when demand is
stochastic.















2 are suciently heterogeneous; (15)
E[Q
m] > (=;<) E[Q




2) > (=;<) 0:
In the absence of uncertainty, it is well-known that, when demands are linear and
market areas are xed, output is the same under the three pricing systems. However,
we see from (15) that with the introduction of demand uncertainty, aggregate expected
output under discriminatory pricing will be less than that under mill pricing if the risk
7volatilities of the two markets are suciently heterogeneous. It will be equivalent under
mill and uniform pricing if x = s=2.9 But, aggregate expected output under mill pricing
is greater (smaller) than that under uniform pricing if (2x   s)(2
1   2
2) > (<) 0. The
equivalence of expected output under the three pricing regimes holds only when the
two markets are equally volatile. It follows that
Proposition 1: In a world with demand uncertainty, even though the expected de-
mands are identical and linear, the equivalence of expected output under the three pric-
ing regimes is invalid unless the markets are equally volatile.
3.2 Expected Utility of Prots
By denition, the monopoly always generates the highest expected utility of prots
under a discriminatory pricing policy.10 But, it is not very clear how the monopoly
ranks between mill and uniform pricing policies. Comparing the expected utility of


















From (16), it is armative that
E[U(m)] = E[U(u(x))] if x = s=2:




In other words, mill and uniform pricing are equally benecial to the monopolist if
the rm's plant location is at the midpoint of the two markets. On the other hand,
when x 6= s=2, mill pricing always yields larger expected utility of prots than uniform
pricing if the two markets are identically risky.11
9The reason for this result is that the delivered prices under the two pricing regimes are equal
when x = s=2.
10In the case of x = s=2 and 2
1 = 2
2, all three pricing policies yield identical outcomes.
11Note that when the two markets are identically risky, E[U(u(x))] is concave in x and achieves
its maximum at x = s=2.
8When there is no uncertainty, Beckmann and Ingene (1976) have proved that, with
identically linear demand curves, prots will be the same under mill and uniform pric-
ing because the prot maximization problems involved are mathematically equivalent
under the two pricing policies. When there exists demand uncertainty, however, the
equivalence result breaks. The reason stems from the fact that the expected utility
maximization problems invloved in the case, namely (6) and (10), are no longer math-
ematically equivalent unless x = s=2. We thus have
Proposition 2: In a world with demand uncertainty, even though the expected de-
mands are identical and linear, the equivalence of expected utility of prots under mill
and uniform pricing does not hold unless the rm's plant location is at the midpoint of
the two markets.
3.3 Expected Consumers' Surplus
When the two markets are identically risky, namely, 2
1 = 2
2 = 2, the three pricing
policies are equally benecial to the consumers as a whole if x = s=2.12 Otherwise, the
well-known welfare result holds, namely, that CSm(x) > CSd(x) > CSu(x).13
In case that the two markets are not equally volatile, it is not obvious how consumers
rank these three pricing policies. Nonetheless, numerical analysis shows that, if 2
1 >
(<) 2
2, then uniform pricing always yields the highest expected consumers' surplus for
x < (>) s=2; whereas discriminatory pricing could perform better than uniform pricing
if the plant location were suciently close to the less risky market. The detail of the
simulation is presented in Figure 2.14
[Place Figure 2 about here.]
12When 2
1 = 2
2 = 2, we have E[CSm(x)]   E[CSu(x)] = bt2  (2x   s)2=4  0, E[CSm(x)]  
E[CSd(x)] = b2t2  [3b + 2  (2   12)]  (2x   s)2=f4  [2b +   (2   12)]2g  0, and E[CSd(x)]  
E[CSu(x)] = bt2  [b +   (2   12)]  (2x   s)2=f4  [2b +   (2   12)]2g  0. It is easy to see that
E[CSm(x)] = E[CSd(x)] = E[CSu(x)] if x = s=2.
13See, for example, Beckmann (1976, p. 628).
14The parameter values used in the simulation are the same as the ones described in the next section.
However, similar results can be obtained for dierent settings of the parameters. Full details of the
simulations are available from the author upon request.
9In a deterministic world, Tan (2001b) demonstrates that uniform pricing never
performs better than the other two policies in terms of consumers' surplus except that
the demands in dierent markets are suciently heterogeneous. In the presence of
uncertainty, in contrast, we have from Figure 2 that
Proposition 3: In a world with demand uncertainty, even though the plant location is
predetermined and the expected demands are identical and linear, uniform pricing can
outperform the other two pricing policies in terms of consumers' surplus if the markets
are not equally volatile.
Dierent degrees of volatility in the markets, therefore, seem to aect the desirability
of uniform pricing in terms of consumers' surplus in a similar pattern as demand
heterogeneity does.
3.4 Social Welfare
Social welfare basically follows the same pattern as the consumers' surplus in the
three pricing regimes when 2
1 = 2
2, namely15
E[W m(x)] = E[W d(x)] = E[W u(x)] if x = s=2,
E[W m(x)] > E[W d(x)] > E[W u(x)] if x 6= s=2.
That is, when the two markets are identically risky, the three pricing policies are
equally desirable from the social perspective if the plant location is at the midpoint of
the location line. Otherwise, the conventional welfare result holds, namely, that mill
(uniform) pricing always provides the highest (lowest) social welfare.
When 2
1 6= 2
2, however, numerical analysis shows that the superiority of mill pric-
ing does not always hold. Uniform/discriminatory pricing could be the most appealing
scheme from the social point of view (see Figure 3). More interestingly, in situations
where the level of social welfare under discriminatory pricing is the greatest among
15If 2
1 = 2
2 = 2, we have E[W m(x) W u(x)] = t2 (2x s)2[b+(2  12)]=4  0, E[W m(x) 
W d(x)] = b2t2  (2x   s)2[b +   (2   12)]=f4 [2b+   (2   12)]2g  0, and E[W d(x)   W u(x)] =
t2  (2x   s)2[b +   (2   12)]2[3b +   (2   12)]=f4  [2b +   (2   12)]2]g  0.
10the three pricing regimes, its aggregate expected output is always the smallest (see the
bottom of Figure 3).
[Place Figure 3 about here.]
In a world without uncertainty, Tan (2001b) shows that mill pricing is always the
most appealing scheme from the social perspective if the plant location is predeter-
mined. But, the social superiority of discriminatory pricing can be resulted from the
introduction of endogenous location choice, whereas the introduction of both endoge-
nous location choice and heterogeneous demands can lead to the social desirability of
uniform pricing. Nonetheless, we have from the above outcome that
Proposition 4: In a world with demand uncertainty, even though the plant location is
predetermined and the expected demands are identical and linear, dierent degrees of
volatility in the markets can result in the social desirability of uniform/discriminatory
pricing under monopoly.
In a spaceless economy, Schmalensee (1981) claimed that when demand curves are
linear, an increase in total output is a necessary condition for discriminatory pricing to
increase welfare. This result has later been generalized by Varian (1985) and Schwartz
(1990) to give it a more general content. Contrastly, the above outcome shows that
Proposition 5: In a world with demand uncertainty, discriminatory pricing may
increase welfare even if the demand curves are linear and the aggregate expected output
is lower than that under mill or uniform pricing.
The intuition behind this welfare paradox is straightforward. In a stochastic en-
vironment, the change in producer's surplus is measured by the change in expected
utility rather than prots. Since prot volatility is positively related to price in each
market under demand uncertainty, the fall in price in the more risky market reduces
prot volatility and might consequently raise producer's surplus suciently to improve
11TABLE 1a. Simulated Firm Locations and Expected Utility of Prots under
Alternative Pricing Policies when the Two Markets are Identically Risky
t xm xu xd E[U(m)] E[U(u)] E[U(d)]
0.20 [0,1] .5000 f0,1g 32.6700 32.6700 32.6733
0.40 [0,1] .5000 f0,1g 32.0133 32.0133 32.0267
0.60 [0,1] .5000 f0,1g 31.3633 31.3633 31.3933
0.80 [0,1] .5000 f0,1g 30.7200 30.7200 30.7733
1.00 [0,1] .5000 f0,1g 30.0833 30.0833 30.1667
1.20 [0,1] .5000 f0,1g 29.4533 29.4533 29.5733
1.40 [0,1] .5000 f0,1g 28.8300 28.8300 28.9933
1.60 [0,1] .5000 f0,1g 28.2133 28.2133 28.4267
1.80 [0,1] .5000 f0,1g 27.6033 27.6033 27.8733
2.00 [0,1] .5000 f0,1g 27.0000 27.0000 27.3333
2.20 [0,1] .5000 f0,1g 26.4033 26.4033 26.8067
2.40 [0,1] .5000 f0,1g 25.8133 25.8133 26.2933
2.60 [0,1] .5000 f0,1g 25.2300 25.2300 25.7933
2.80 [0,1] .5000 f0,1g 24.6533 24.6533 25.3067
3.00 [0,1] .5000 f0,1g 24.0833 24.0833 24.8333
3.20 [0,1] .5000 f0,1g 23.5200 23.5200 24.3733
3.40 [0,1] .5000 f0,1g 22.9633 22.9633 23.9267
3.60 [0,1] .5000 f0,1g 22.4133 22.4133 23.4933
3.80 [0,1] .5000 f0,1g 21.8700 21.8700 23.0733
4.00 [0,1] .5000 f0,1g 21.3333 21.3333 22.6667
social welfare, despite a fall in aggregate expected output.
4. Comparisons of Alternative Pricing Policies with Endogenous Location
Choice
Now we examine the implications of uncertainty on the performance of alternative
pricing policies when the location choice of the rm is endogenous. Since no simple
general criteria for welfare comparisons seem possible, we present a number of sim-
ulations. The parameters are normalized such that s = b = 1; and the value for a
is specied at 10. Moreover, we let  = 1. With respect to the stochasticity of the
demand functions, for simplicity we let 12 = 0 and consider the following two cases:
Case 1, where the two markets are identically risky, and Case 2, where market 1 is
more risky than market 2. The parameter values used for Case 1 are 2
1 = 2
2 = 1, and
for Case 2 are 2
1 = 4 and 2
2 = 1.16 The results are presented in Tables 1a, 1b, 2a and
2b.
16Similar results can be obtained for dierent values of 2
1.
12TABLE 1b. Simulated Consumers' Surplus and Welfare under Alternative Pricing
Policies when the Two Markets are Identically Risky
t E[CSm] E[CSu] E[CSd] E[W m] E[W u] E[W d]
0.20 [44.5600, 44.5700]a 44.5600 44.5644 [77.2300, 77.2400] 77.2300 77.2378
0.40 [43.6844, 43.7244] 43.6844 43.7022 [75.6978, 75.7378] 75.6978 75.7278
0.60 [42.8178, 42.9078] 42.8178 42.8577 [74.1811, 74.2711] 74.1811 74.2511
0.80 [41.9600, 42.1200] 41.9600 42.0311 [72.6800, 72.8400] 72.6800 72.8044
1.00 [41.1111, 41.3611] 41.1111 41.2222 [71.1944, 71.4444] 71.1944 71.3889
1.20 [40.2711, 40.6311] 40.2711 40.4311 [69.7244, 70.0844] 69.7244 70.0044
1.40 [39.4400, 39.9300] 39.4400 39.6577 [68.2700, 68.7600] 68.2700 68.6511
1.60 [38.6178, 39.2578] 38.6178 38.9022 [66.8311, 67.4711] 66.8311 67.3289
1.80 [37.8044, 38.6144] 37.8044 38.1644 [65.4078, 66.2178] 65.4078 66.0378
2.00 [37.0000, 38.0000] 37.0000 37.4444 [64.0000, 65.0000] 64.0000 64.7778
2.20 [36.2044, 37.4144] 36.2044 36.7422 [62.6078, 63.8178] 62.6078 63.5489
2.40 [35.4178, 36.8578] 35.4178 36.0577 [61.2311, 62.6711] 61.2311 62.3511
2.60 [34.6400, 36.3300] 34.6400 35.3911 [59.8700, 61.5600] 59.8700 61.1844
2.80 [33.8711, 35.8311] 33.8711 34.7422 [58.5244, 60.4844] 58.5244 60.0489
3.00 [33.1111, 35.3611] 33.1111 34.1111 [57.1944, 59.4444] 57.1944 58.9444
3.20 [32.3600, 34.9200] 32.3600 33.4977 [55.8800, 58.4400] 55.8800 57.8711
3.40 [31.6178, 34.5078] 31.6178 32.9022 [54.5811, 57.4711] 54.5811 56.8289
3.60 [30.8844, 34.1244] 30.8844 32.3244 [53.2978, 56.5378] 53.2978 55.8178
3.80 [30.1600, 33.7700] 30.1600 31.7644 [52.0300, 55.6400] 52.0300 54.8378
4.00 [29.4444, 33.4444] 29.4444 31.2222 [50.7778, 54.7778] 50.7778 53.8889
a The notation has the meaning that 44:5600  CSm  44:5700, with the minimum
occurring at x = 1=2, and the maximum at x = 0 and x = 1.
4.1 Optimal Location
We know from Section 2 that the optimal location under mill pricing can be at
any point between market 1 and market 2, namely, xm 2 [0;1]. If the two markets
are identically risky, a uniform pricer will locate at the midpoint of the location line,
namely, xu = 1=2, whereas a discriminatory monopolist may locate either in market
1 or market 2, namely, xd 2 f0;1g. Contrastly, if the two markets are not equally
volatile, then a uniform pricer's optimal location is in the less risky market or in the
interior of the location line (see Table 2a), and that for a discriminatory pricer is in
the less risky market, namely, xd = 1.
In a nonstochatic environment, the optimal location under uniform pricing must be
corner solutions in case that the demand curves are linear.17 The results in (12) and
Table 2a show an interesting outcome, namely
17This can be easily derived from Hwang and Mai (1990).
13TABLE 2a. Simulated Firm Locations and Expected Utility of Prots under
Alternative Pricing Policies when Market 1 is More Risky than Market 2
t xm xu xd E[U(m)] E[U(u)] E[U(d)]
0.20 [0,1] 1.0000 1.0000 21.7800 22.4200 24.6700
0.40 [0,1] 1.0000 1.0000 21.3422 22.5689 24.3467
0.60 [0,1] 1.0000 1.0000 20.9088 22.6689 24.0300
0.80 [0,1] 1.0000 1.0000 20.4800 22.7200 23.7200
1.00 [0,1] 1.0000 1.0000 20.0556 22.7222 23.4167
1.20 [0,1] 1.0000 1.0000 19.6356 22.6756 23.1200
1.40 [0,1] 1.0000 1.0000 19.2200 22.5800 22.8300
1.60 [0,1] 1.0000 1.0000 18.8089 22.4356 22.5467
1.80 [0,1] 1.0000 1.0000 18.4022 22.2422 22.2700
2.00 [0,1] 1.0000 1.0000 18.0000 22.0000 22.0000
2.20 [0,1] 1.0000 1.0000 17.6022 21.7089 21.7367
2.40 [0,1] 1.0000 1.0000 17.2089 20.3689 21.4800
2.60 [0,1] 1.0000 1.0000 16.8200 20.9800 21.2300
2.80 [0,1] 1.0000 1.0000 16.4356 20.5422 20.9867
3.00 [0,1] 0.9722 1.0000 16.0556 20.0694 20.7500
3.20 [0,1] 0.9375 1.0000 15.6800 19.6000 20.5200
3.40 [0,1] 0.9069 1.0000 15.3089 19.1361 20.2967
3.60 [0,1] 0.8796 1.0000 14.9422 18.6778 20.0800
3.80 [0,1] 0.8553 1.0000 14.5800 18.2250 19.8700
4.00 [0,1] 0.8333 1.0000 14.2222 17.7778 19.6667
Proposition 6: In a world with demand uncertainty, even though the demand curvess
are linear, a uniform pricer's optimal location may be interior.
4.2 Expected Utility of Prots
Discriminatory pricing clearly yields the highest expected utility of prots. As
the optimal location for a uniform pricer is at the midpoint of the location line when
2
1 = 2
2, we see from (17) that mill and uniform pricing will result in the same level
of maximum expected utility in our case. Otherwise, uniform pricing is shown to be
preferable to mill pricing by the monopolist (see Table 2a). It follows that, unless the
markets are equally volatile, the nonequivalence of expected utility of prots under
mill and uniform pricing prevails in a world with demand uncertainty, even though the
expected demands are identical and linear.
14TABLE 2b. Simulated Consumers' Surplus and Welfare under Alternative Pricing
Policies when Market 1 is More Risky than Market 2
t E[CSm] E[CSu] E[CSd] E[W m] E[W u] E[W d]
0.20 [61.7900, 61.8000] 61.2778 58.0694 [83.5700, 83.5800] 83.6978 82.7394
0.40 [60.5983, 60.6383] 59.5864 56.7222 [81.9405, 81.9805] 82.1553 81.0689
0.60 [59.4186, 59.5086] 57.9197 55.4027 [80.3275, 80.4175] 80.5886 79.4328
0.80 [58.2511, 58.4111] 56.2778 54.1111 [78.7311, 78.8911] 78.9978 77.8311
1.00 [57.0957, 57.3457] 54.6604 52.8472 [77.1512, 77.4012] 77.3827 76.2639
1.20 [55.9524, 56.3124] 53.0679 51.6111 [75.5879, 75.9479] 75.7435 74.7311
1.40 [54.8211, 55.3111] 51.5000 50.4027 [74.0411, 74.5311] 74.0800 73.2328
1.60 [53.7020, 54.3420] 49.9567 49.2222 [72.5109, 73.1509] 72.3924 71.7689
1.80 [52.5949, 53.4049] 48.4382 48.0694 [70.9972, 71.8072] 70.6805 70.3394
2.00 [51.5000, 52.5000] 46.9444 46.9444 [69.5000, 70.5000] 68.9444 68.9444
2.20 [50.4172, 51.6272] 45.4753 45.8472 [68.0194, 69.2294] 67.1842 67.5839
2.40 [49.3464, 50.7864] 44.0308 44.7778 [66.5553, 67.9953] 65.3998 66.2578
2.60 [48.2878, 49.9778] 42.6111 43.7361 [65.1078, 66.7978] 63.6911 64.9661
2.80 [47.2412, 49.2012] 41.2160 42.7222 [63.6768, 65.6368] 61.7583 63.7089
3.00 [46.2068, 48.4568] 40.1862 41.7361 [62.2624, 64.5124] 60.2557 62.4861
3.20 [45.1844, 47.7444] 39.3044 40.7778 [60.8644, 63.4244] 58.9044 61.2978
3.40 [44.1742, 47.0642] 38.4328 39.8472 [59.4831, 62.3731] 57.5690 60.1439
3.60 [43.1761, 46.4161] 37.5731 38.9444 [58.1183, 61.3583] 56.2509 59.0244
3.80 [42.1900, 45.8000] 36.7219 38.0694 [56.7700, 60.3800] 54.9470 57.9394
4.00 [41.2161, 45.2161] 35.8832 38.2222 [55.4383, 59.4383] 53.6610 56.8889
4.3 Expected Consumers' Surplus
Since the optimal mill price is independent of x, we infer from (7) that CSm is
convex with respect to x, with the minimum occurring at x = 1=2, and the maximum
at x = 0 and x = 1. When the two markets are identically risky, as xu = 1=2, mill and
uniform pricing are equally benecial to consumers as a whole if xm = 1=2; otherwise,
mill pricing is preferable to uniform pricing. In addition, comparing CSd with CSm
yields CSm(xm = 1=2) < CSd < CSm(xm = 0) = CSm(xm = 1). It follows that mill
pricing will be most benecial to consumers as a whole if the mill pricer locates his
plant either in market 1 or market 2, whereas discriminatory pricing could give rise to
the highest consumers' surplus if the mill pricer locates somewhere between the two
markets (see Table 1b).
When the two markets are not equally volatile, we see from Table 2b that mill
pricing is always the most preferable policy for the consumers as a whole. Uniform
(discriminatory) pricing is the least preferable for t > (<) 2:0.
154.4 Social Welfare
Since E[U(m)] is independent of x, social welfare basically follows the same pat-
tern as the consumers' surplus, namely, that W m is convex with respect to x, with the
minimum occurring at x = 1=2, and the maximum at x = 0 and x = 1. It follows,
when 2
1 = 2
2, that mill and uniform pricing are equally socially desirable if xm = 1=2;
otherwise, mill pricing provides higher social welfare than uniform pricing. Further-
more, the comparison of W d with W m yields W m(xm = 1=2) < W d < W m(xm = 0) =
W m(xm = 1). Accordingly, while mill pricing is the most socially desirable pricing
policy for xm = 0 or xm = 1, discriminatory pricing could yield the highest social




2, Table 2b reports that, irrespective of where the mill pricer locates,
uniform pricing is the most socially desirable pricing policy for values of t at or below
0.80. On the other hand, if the mill pricer locates either in market 1 or market 2, then
mill pricing will dominate for t  1:0, whereas discriminatory (uniform) pricing could
yield the highest social welfare for t  2:80 (1:0  t  1:40) if the mill pricer were to
locate somewhere between the two markets.
In a deterministic world, Tan (2001b) nds that when the endogenous location
choices are the same under the three pricing regimes, mill pricing always gives the
highest social welfare. Here, we have from Tables 2a and 2b that
Proposition 7: In a world with demand uncertainty, even though the endogenous lo-
cation choices are the same under the three pricng policies, dierent degrees of volatility
in the markets can result in the social desirability of uniform pricing under monopoly.
5. Conclusion
This paper reexamines the welfare implications of three pricing regimes (mill, uni-
form and discriminatory) for a monopoly in a stochastic environment. It considers
a risk-averse monopolist faces two markets with identically linear but stochastic de-
16mands. Our analysis shows that, with the introduction of demand uncertainty, the
ranking of the three pricing policies could be very dierent from that of a deterministic
counterpart. Specically, in a world without uncertainty, it has been shown that when
the demand curves are linear and the plant location is predetermined, output is the
same under the three pricing systems (Beckmann, 1976), that prots will be equiva-
lent under mill and uniform pricing if the demand curves are identical (Beckmann and
Ingene, 1976), and that uniform pricing never performs better than the other two in
terms of consumers' surplus and social welfare (Beckmann 1976; Tan, 2001b). In the
presence of demand uncertainty, however, this paper shows that, with a predetermined
plant location and identically linear expected demands:
i) the equivalence of expected output under the three pricing regimes is invalid
unless the two markets are identically risky;
ii) the equivalence of expected utility of prots under mill and uniform pricing does
not hold unless the rm's plant location is at the midpoint of the two markets; and
iii) uniform pricing could outperform the other two in terms of consumers' surplus
and social welfare if the markets were not equally volatile.
In addition, it is demonstrated that the conventional Schmalensee-Varian-Schwartz
result, namely that an increase in aggregate output is a necessary condition for dicrim-
inatory pricing to increase welfare, is invalid in the stochastic model. The reason for
the reversal of orthodox intuition is shown to be driven by the asymmetry in the risk
chacteristics of the markets and the willingness of the monopolist to trade increased
level of expected prots for reduced risk.
Lastly, in a nonstochastic world, Tan (2001b) shows that the social superiority of
discriminatory pricing can be resulted from the introduction of endogenous location
choice, whereas the introduction of both endogenous location choice and heterogeneous
demands can lead to the social desirability of uniform pricing. One of the major ndings
of the paper is that, in a world with demand uncertainty, even though the plant location
17is predetermined and the expected demands are identical, dierent degrees of volatility
in the markets can result in the social desirability of uniform/discriminatory pricing
under monopoly. Although the setup of the model is too restrictive to have general
implications, the analysis provides a rationale for the legal status of uniform pricing
and casts doubt on the presumed social undesirability of price discrimination.
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